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The international community has sought to assist the development efforts of the CIS-7 countries 
since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The international financial institutions 
have played a leading role in these efforts. Despite considerable engagement with the 
governments of these countries, overall progress has been disappointing. In this paper, we 
review the contribution of the international community to the transition challenge facing the 
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Without doubt, the collapse of the communist bloc and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union during 1989-1991 represented the largest regime change experienced in the 
world since the 1940s. In terms of economic policy, the countries that emerged from 
the ruins of the Soviet Bloc faced major challenges in terms of re-moulding 
institutions and markets to deliver growth and prosperity for their citizens. The scale 
of the adjustment problem was most acute for the countries in the Former Soviet 
Union. These countries had economic structures that were directed towards fulfilling 
specialized roles within the Soviet central planning system: for this group, the 
challenge of building self-functioning market-based economies was especially severe. 
 
From the beginning, the international community recognized that assistance should be 
made available to assist the transition process in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
newly independent states of the Former Soviet Union. Regarding the latter group, the 
Economic Declaration of the July 1992 G-7 Munich Summit promised
1 
 
“We offer the new States our help for their self help.” 
 
This position recognized that the primary responsibility for development resided with 
the countries of the Former Soviet Union but that their efforts should be supported 
and facilitated by international aid. The G-7 Munich declaration went on to state 
 
“We welcome the membership of the new States in the international financial 
institutions. This will allow them to work out economic reform programmes in 
collaboration with these institutions and on this basis to make use of their substantial 
financial resources. Disbursement of these funds should be linked to progress in 
implementing reforms.” 
 
The international community thereby charged the international financial institutions 
with a central role in assisting the development efforts of these countries. In tandem 
                                                 




with their new responsibilities in the other transition countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, this represented a major new challenge for the multilateral organizations.   
This statement also explicitly highlighted the importance of conditioning financial 
support on the success of the authorities in these countries in restructuring their 
economies: it was envisaged that aid would be allocated in a discriminating fashion 
and the withdrawal of support was threatened for non-performers. The text also 
indicates the desirability of a partnership model by which these countries would 
actively contribute to the design of the reform programmes that would be approved by 
the international financial institutions. 
 
Our goal in this paper is to examine the contribution of the international community to 
the development efforts in the CIS-7 countries.
2 This group is defined by low income 
levels that reflect very sharp output reductions after the collapse of the Soviet Union: 
these countries are now the target of renewed international development efforts, with 
the launch of the CIS-7 Initiative in 2002 (see The World Bank et al. 2002). In line 
with their predominant role as the main conduits for international assistance to these 
countries, the primary focus is on the role played by the international financial 
institutions that have been active in these countries (the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the 
Asian Development Bank). However, we will also address the other mechanisms by 
which the international community influences the development of these countries. 
 
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we briefly review the 
debate about appropriate strategy for transition countries. Some basic facts about the 
CIS-7 countries are presented and discussed in section 3. Section 4 describes and 
analyses the involvement of the international financial institutions in the CIS-7 
economies. We turn in section 5 to discussion of recent initiatives to reform the 
international financial institutions before addressing their future role in the CIS-7 
countries in section 6. Finally, some concluding remarks are offered in section 7.  
 
                                                 
2 The CIS-7 countries are Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan. These are all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).  
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2. The Transition Debate 
 
From the beginning, there was little disagreement among analysts that the ultimate 
goal was to establish market-based systems in the transition countries. Moreover, it 
was also widely accepted that macroeconomic stabilization was a required component 
of any reform strategy. 
 
Beyond those core elements, there has been considerable debate about the relative 
merits of ‘big bang’ versus ‘gradualist’ approaches to reform. Adherents to the former 
approach took the view that it was best to move rapidly in establishing a market-based 
system, liberalizing prices and trade as quickly as possible and moving enterprises out 
of state hands through small- and large-scale privatization programs. At a political 
economy level, it was argued that a rapid transition would prevent the emergence of 
blocking coalitions of anti-reformist groups that gained from the status quo or feared 
change. 
 
Proponents of ‘gradualism’ rather argued that it inevitably takes time to establish the 
institutions required to ensure markets operate efficiently and avoid excessive social 
disruption. Indeed, there is no unique set of institutions that is required to have a 
successful market economy. In this regard, to name just three policy areas, the 
industrial countries vary quite significantly in terms of legal codes, welfare programs 
and financial systems.  
 
Moreover, gradualists claim that popular support for reform could actually be 
enhanced by a partial, gradualist approach: for instance, a targeted initial reform may 
assuage fears and in itself create new interest groups that will support and lobby for 
further stages of reform.
3 Against this view, Fischer (2002) points out that it assumes 
that a degree of political stability and a capacity to forecast the impact of specific 
reforms that was absent in many transition countries, most particularly in the CIS. 
With respect to building institutional capacity, even ‘big-bang’ adherents recognized 
the importance of devoting resources to establishing appropriate legal codes, 
regulatory and tax systems.  
                                                 




At an intermediate level, it seems sensible to hold the position that the appropriate 
speed and nature of reform will differ across countries depending on their initial 
conditions and specific economic structures. For instance, Sachs (1995) argued that a 
‘big bang’ approach was desirable for countries in Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union that were highly urbanized, with extensive social welfare systems and 
large state-owned industrial sectors which needed rapid dismantling. In contrast, 
countries that began reform as agriculturally-orientated rural economies with limited 




Mukand and Rodrik (2002) highlight the international and locational aspects to 
determining the nature of reform efforts in different countries. In their framework, 
appropriate institutions vary across countries and must be discovered through policy 
experimentation. A country that is a close neighbour to a ‘leader’ has the option to 
imitate its institutions and, being fundamentally similar, this is likely to be a 
successful strategy. At the other extreme, a remote country may not enjoy the 
demonstration effect provided by a neighboring leader but may achieve success 
through unfettered experimentation. Since remote countries experiment in order to 
identify appropriate institutional structures, it also follows that there is likely to be a 
high variance in outcomes among this group.  
 
The worst off are the intermediate countries: these may be tempted to imitate a leader 
that is ‘not too far away’ but this may be a flawed strategy, since their structural 
differences are such that attempts at institutional transplantation may fail. An 
additional prediction of this theory is that corruption is an increasing function of 
remoteness: governments in countries that are closer towards ‘leaders’ are more 
constrained in their actions.  
 
These authors conduct an empirical test using the growth and reform experiences of 
the post-socialist countries. They find a U-shaped relation between growth and 
                                                 
4 Even reform of agriculture was easier in China than in the Former Soviet Union, due to the peasant 




distance from the European Union, which is the natural ‘leader’ for these countries. 
The fastest-growing transition countries have been those closest to the European 
Union but the more remote countries (the Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan) 
have done better than intermediate cases such as Russia, the Ukraine, Moldova, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia. Although intriguing, the Mukand-Rodrik hypothesis only 
‘explains’ the dire performance of a remote country such as Tajikistan by attributing it 
to institutional experimentation that ex-post proved to be a failure. Moreover, it is 
plausible that Russia rather than the European Union is the natural anchor for these 
countries: the instability of the Russian reform process during the 1990s failed to 
provide much by way of positive example for the CIS-7 countries. 
 
In terms of application to the CIS-7 countries, there are conflicting elements in this 
debate. At one level, very rapid reform may have been especially difficult for these 
countries in view of the scale of the development challenges they faced and the 
absence of a natural policy anchor, such as the prospect of eventual European Union 
membership provided for the Central and Eastern European transition countries. In 
related fashion, the initial conditions and political structures of these countries 
presented the international financial institutions with a different set of challenges to 
the more advanced and Western-orientated transition countries. At another level, the 
debate on the sequencing of reforms is quite relevant for these countries: for instance, 
price liberalization has been considerably easier than tackling more deep-seated 
institutional deficiencies.  
 
With respect to the political economy of transition, following Aslund et al (2002), a 
slow pace of stabilization and reform has risked leaving some of these countries in an 
‘under-reform trap’ by allowing the formation and consolidation of anti-reform 
lobbies and political groups. In addition, it is unclear the extent to which the 
formation of dynamically-sustainable pro-reform coalitions can be easily predicted in 
societies with complex ethnic and political structures: designing an ‘optimal’ 





3. The CIS-7: Basic Features 
 
Table 1 displays some basic characteristics of the CIS-7 countries.
5  Even by 2001, 
these remain low-income countries, with Tajikstan among the poorest spots on earth. 
With the exception of the larger Uzbekistan, these are small (but not tiny) countries in 
terms of population. Infant mortality rates are poor and life expectancy is well below 
developed-nation levels. These countries are geographically remote (especially the 
Central Asian republics) and trading costs are high, with the landlocked countries 
worst off.
6 Almost all of these countries have been, or continue to be, engaged in 
serious internal or external conflicts since gaining formal independence.
7 
 
Compared to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe that had at least some 
historical experience with a market-based economic system and that operated as 
quasi-autonomous economies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, the CIS-7 countries had all 
been members of the Soviet Union. As such, these countries had been heavily 
integrated into the centrally-planned Soviet economy, with highly-skewed patterns of 
specialization and little domestic competence in managing independent economies. I 




The output growth and inflation rates for these countries over the 1991-2001 period 
are shown in Tables 2 and 3.
9 These tables show a pattern of severely negative growth 
and extremely rapid inflation during the first half of the 1990s but significant 
stabilization was achieved subsequently, with generally decent output growth in the 
1996-2001 period and much lower inflation rates.
10 In some cases, good recent growth 
                                                 
5 The table shows PPP-adjusted output per capita: the values in current dollars are much lower. 
6 There is an active debate on the importance of geographical factors for economic performance. See 
Gallup et al (1999). 
7 See Collier (1999) on the severe economic disruption generated by civil wars. 
8 Even by 2001, agriculture still accounted for between 20 percent (Tajkistan) to 40 percent (Armenia) 
of value-added (source: CIA World Factbook). 
9 With respect to monetary evolution, all of these countries were members of the ruble zone until 1993. 
See Odling-Smee and Pastor (2001) and Pomfret (2001) on the ruble zone episode and the role of IMF 
advice on currency arrangements during this period. The inflation rates in Tajikstan and Uzbekistan 
remain quite high at 38.6 percent and 27.2 percent respectively in 2001 but even these rates are 
nowhere near the levels experienced in the early and middle 1990s. 
10 To some extent, the data probably exaggerate the scale of the initial output declines, due to well-
known measurement problems. Despite being a slow reformer, Uzbekistan experienced a  
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performance has been aided by natural resource windfalls (oil in Azerbaijan; gold in 
the Kyrgyz Republic).  
 
The initial phase involved shows a much deeper and more prolonged initial output 
decline and delayed stabilization as compared to most of the transition economies in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In this regard, an obvious question to ask is whether the 
CIS-7 countries were slower reformers than other transition economies. To address 
this question, Table 4 reports the results for pooled regressions of the form 
  
  *7 ijt j i ijt REFORM CIS α βε = ++  (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is one of the reform indices reported by the EBRD in its 
Annual Transition Report and  7i CIS  is a 0-1 dummy variable that takes the value 1 
for CIS-7 countries and 0 for the other transition countries. (The data period is 1991-
1999).
11  With the exception of the price liberalization index, the CIS7 dummy 
variable is significantly negative in all cases, confirming that these countries as a 
group have lagged behind the reform efforts in other transition countries.
12  
 
Table 5 repeats the exercise for 1999, the last year in our dataset. At least for some 
categories, there is evidence of catch-up: the CIS7 dummy variable is no longer 
significant for trade liberalization, large-scale privatization and the legal reform 
indicators. However, significant differences in the level of reform between the CIS-7 
countries and others in the transition group remain for the other categories.  
 
The CIS-7 countries were especially slow to reform in the initial 1991-1994 period. In 
most cases, economic development and reform took second place to the struggle 
between rival blocs for political supremacy, spilling over into civil war in Tajikistan, a 
                                                                                                                                            
comparatively mild initial contraction and grew well thereafter. Zettelmeyer (1999) studies this case: 
according to his findings, its comparatively good growth performance can be attributed to (i) a small 
inherited industrial sector; (ii) cotton production; and (iii) self-sufficiency in energy. 
11 The values of the EBRD indicators range from 0 to 4, with a higher value indicating a higher level of 
reform. 
12 The explanatory power of these regressions is typically low. This is not surprising since we know 
that set of transition countries varies enormously across a range of dimensions. See de Melo et al 
(2001) and Falcetti et al (2002) for recent analyses of the determinants of reform efforts. Our purpose is 
merely to document a group difference in average reform efforts.  
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major insurgency in Georgia, the Transnistria conflict in Moldova, and with Armenia 
and Azerbaijan in conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. The comparative weakness of 
internal political systems in these countries put them at a substantial disadvantage 
compared to the majority of Central and Eastern European countries. In some cases, 
officials from the Russian minority within these countries were pushed out for 
political reasons, with their replacements lacking similar training or experience. 
 
Table 6 reports aggregate aid flows to the CIS-7 countries over 1995-2000. Overall, 
aid flows have represented a considerable fraction of national incomes. However, 
there has also been substantial cross-country variation: average aid flows ranged from 
only 1 percent of GDP for Uzbekistan to 16.9 percent for the Kyrgyz Republic. This 
variation is not correlated with output per capita (the correlation is an insignificant -
0.06) or with the extensiveness of reform (the correlation with a composite of the 
EBRD indicators is only -0.12).  
 
This brief review suggests that the CIS-7 countries as a group are indeed distinctive in 
terms of their transition experience. Although significant growth and reform have 
been achieved since the mid-1990s, these countries did not ‘turn the corner’ as 
quickly as, and still largely lag behind, the more advanced transition countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe. In this context, it is important to address the question of 
how the international community (and the international financial institutions in 
particular) have performed in assisting the transition process in these countries and 
whether alternative strategies to those currently pursued can better tackle the 
considerable developmental challenges that still face these countries. 
 
4. The International Financial Institutions and the CIS-7 
 
As was noted in the introduction, the international community responded to the 
destruction of the communist bloc by charging the international financial institutions 
with the task of aiding the transition of the emerging post-communist independent 
states to ‘normal’ market economies. Indeed, the EBRD was established in direct 
response to this challenge, as a complementary agency to the activities of the already-




The CIS-7 countries were quickly admitted to membership of the International 
Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the EBRD in 1992 following the break-up of the 
Soviet Union (see Table 7).
13 For those in the region and eligible to join, membership 
of the Asian Development Bank took longer, with Tajikstan only joining in 1998 and 
Azerbaijan in 1999. 
  
We can think of the international financial institutions as providing three kinds of 
assistance: (a) policy advice; (b) technical assistance; and (c) financial support. With 
regard to the first category and in line with its mandate, the International Monetary 
Fund has taken the lead in providing advice on macroeconomic stabilization, balance 
of payments issues and fiscal affairs. However, it also advised in related areas (such 
as banking stability and banking regulation) and on broader items on the structural 
reform agenda. 
 
In addition to advice on individual projects and sectoral issues, the World Bank has 
also been a lead advisor on structural adjustment, public finances and financial sector 
reform. Policy surveillance and assessments are central to the regular Article IV 
missions conducted by the International Monetary Fund and the Country Assessment 
Strategy (CAS) reports prepared by the World Bank, in addition to influencing the 
conditions attached to the loan and assistance agreements that are negotiated with the 
individual countries. The policy advice offered by these institutions is now in 
principle integrated into the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process (see 
Section 5 below).   
 
At one level, there is a broad consensus about the correct ultimate policy targets for 
these countries. In addition to macroeconomic stability, obvious elements of reform 
include price and trade liberalization, privatization of small- and large-scale 
enterprises, the provision of basic infrastructure, the establishment of an investment-
friendly business environment, and the implementation of appropriate legal codes and 
appropriate regulatory structures. Of course, even with a general acceptance of the 
desirability of all these elements of reform, this still leaves plenty of room for debate 
                                                 
13 Tajikstan did not join the Washington institutions until 1993.  
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about appropriate sequencing and the relative priorities among this wish list. There 
also remains the core issue for the international institutions of the appropriate 
financing of national development strategies. In addition, the coordination of policy 
advice to ensure a consistent and streamlined framework presented a considerable 
management challenge for the multilateral agencies. 
 
However, evaluating the quality of policy advice from the international financial 
institutions is extremely problematic. Sovereign nations are free to disregard or only 
loosely implement external policy advice, such that economic outcomes cannot be 
closely linked to the policy advice given.
14 In addition, country reports by the 
international institutions do not reveal the full degree of interaction between staff 
members and the national authorities in policy formation: policy errors may be 
avoided by private and informal interventions and published documents tend to focus 
only on a negotiated list of specific policy recommendations rather than on the entire 
dynamic process of interaction between external advisors and domestic policymakers. 
 
Turning to the policy record of the CIS-7 countries, it seems apparent that the major 
problem so far has been a failure to sufficiently implement reforms rather than 
adoption of possibly erroneous policies that were recommended by the external 
agencies. A more serious concern relates to advice concerning financial policy, in 
view of the high debt burdens in some of these countries: we turn to this issue below.  
 
At a more challenging level, it could also be argued that the international financial 
institutions could have done more to understand the political obstacles to rapid reform 
in the CIS-7 countries and assist in the design of appropriately gradualist strategies 
that cumulatively build a reform momentum. Aside from the difficulty of correctly 
selecting such strategies in real time and without the benefit of hindsight, it raises the 
fundamental issue of the appropriateness of the international financial institutions 
becoming too involved in domestic political decisions. 
 
In terms of technical assistance, the international financial institutions devoted 
considerable resources to providing technical advice to the CIS-7 and other transition 
                                                 
14Of course, economic performance is also influenced by various shocks that may disrupt the forecasts 




15 This took various formats from short-term training courses to financing 
long-stay technical experts to advise on the establishment of central banks, budgetary 
procedures, corporate and bankruptcy law and financial regulation. Table 8 lists the 
raw number and sectoral distribution of technical assistance missions from the 
International Monetary Fund to some of the CIS-7 countries in recent years. As befits 
its expertise, these missions have primarily been to provide technical advice on 
monetary and exchange affairs and fiscal processes.   
 
The delivery of such technical assistance presented the multilaterals with substantial 
resource and logistical demands. The success of these programs was inevitably greater 
in the more straightforward areas (such as the establishment of a functioning central 
bank) than in achieving rapid progress in improving the quality of governance in 
‘softer’ areas such as establishing a predictable rule of law. It also relied on the 
domestic governments exploiting the lessons from short-term training modules and 
efficiently using long-stay resident advisors. To a significant degree, the flow of 
trained personnel from the public to the private sector (especially in the financial 
sector area) meant that much technical assistance required periodic repetition, in order 
to train in new cohorts of policy officials.
16  
 
Table 9 reports some broad external debt statistics for the CIS-7 countries for the 
years 1995 and 2000. We take 1995 as a useful initial reference point, since lending to 
most of the CIS-7 countries was more restricted before 1995 due to political 
instability and internal military conflicts.  Moreover, there was an initial bilateral 
learning period, as the international financial institutions studied these little-known 
economies and the governments of these countries gained awareness of the financing 
options that were available from the multilaterals.
17  The failure to achieve early 
macroeconomic stabilization also disqualified these countries from significant levels 
of funding during the initial years following independence. 
 
                                                 
15 The European Union through its TACIS program, some UN agencies and bilateral donors have also 
provided technical assistance in specific policy areas. 
16 However, this cannot really be interpreted as being of zero value in that there is a social benefit to 
building up the expertise of the private sector in these countries. 
17 In some cases (e.g. Tajikistan in 1993), the World Bank provided grant aid to assist the government 
in managing and making effective use of external assistance. See also Zecchini (1995).  
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Since 1995, the CIS-7 countries have generally experienced sharp increases in the 
ratio of external debt to output and debt growth was most dramatic in the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova and Tajikistan.  The fallout from the ruble devaluation by Russia 
in 1998 also contributed to the adverse debt dynamics, since many of these countries 
also responded with large depreciations vis-a-vis the US dollar that had the effect of 
increasing the real burden of foreign-currency debt liabilities.  
 
Excessive debt levels are now a concern in several of these countries. Georgia and the 
Kyrgyz Republic have both negotiated Paris Club agreements (in 2001 and 2002 
respectively) that has led to some reduction and rescheduling of bilateral debts and 




Apart from oil-rich Azerbaijan, debt liabilities are overwhelmingly long-term in 
maturity. However, as is clear from Table 9, this does not reflect a capacity to issue 
long-term debt to private investors but rather a heavy reliance on official financing.
19  
The large rise in official external debt relative to output during this period does not 
suggest an unwillingness by the international financial institutions to provide 
financing for these countries.  
 
Indeed, it may even represent ‘overlending’ to extent that borrowed funds were 
inefficiently deployed and the accumulated debt burden is constraining development 
strategy in some of these countries. In turn, overlending may be the result of excessive 
optimism on the part of the multilaterals in terms of the anticipated growth 
performance of these economies or may reflect an inability to deprive badly-behaved 
governments from obtaining access to official funding. In the latter case, international 
resources are wasted and debtor moral hazard is encouraged in that a failure to deliver 
reform need not involve a sustained suspension from borrowing. The international 
institutions may in the short-term raise the spectre of not agreeing to a new financial 
program or disbursing certain funds but the pressure to stay ‘engaged’ in such 
                                                 
18 See http://www.clubdeparis.org for details. Debt-equity swaps and other conversion arrangements 
have also been part of these debt renegotiations. 
19 In some countries (Moldova, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), long-term debt owed to private institutions 
has noticeably increased.   
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countries means that it is much more difficult to withdraw from lending for a longer 
period of time. 
 
Tables 10 and 11 provide details on the financial relations between the CIS-7 and the 
IMF. Table 10 shows that stand-by arrangements were the initial source of financing 
for these countries, which were then succeeded by other mechanisms such as the 
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF). More recently all but Uzbekistan 
have entered into Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) arrangements with 
the Fund.
20 Table 11 shows cumulative disbursements and repayments over 1994-
2002, plus details on charges/interest paid. The importance of cumulative IMF 
financing ranged from just 2 percent of GDP in Uzbekistan to 24.1 percent in 
Moldova.  It is notable that the correlation between DISB/GDP and output per capita 
is significantly negative at -0.81: the poorer countries receive proportionately more 
IMF funding. 
 
We turn to World Bank lending to the CIS-7 countries in Tables 12 and 13.  Table 12 
shows that the cumulative value of World Bank loan commitments has been quite 
significant in each of the CIS-7 countries. However there is also considerable 
variation across the countries from a minimum of 15 percent of GDP in Tajikistan to 
35 percent in Uzbekistan. This pattern is quite systematic in that the correlation 
between the commitment share and the level of GDP per capita is 0.82: the higher 
income countries receive proportionally more World Bank funds. This correlation 
may reflect a insufficient number of high-quality projects that meet World Bank 
hurdle criteria in the poorest countries.  
 
The contrast with the financing-income correlation for IMF financing is also quite 
striking. Table 13 shows the sectoral composition of World Bank lending 
commitments. Projects are spread over a large number of sectors, with the ‘legal and 
public administration’ category being the single largest recipient. This seems 
appropriate, in that the single greatest challenge facing these countries is to improve 
the quality of governance. 
 
                                                 
20 The PRGF replaced the ESAF in 1999.  
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We next report EBRD activity in Table 14. The EBRD’s investments in the CIS-7 
countries have been substantial, totalling almost €2 billion. Although the EBRD in 
principle takes both equity and debt stakes in targeted enterprises, debt comprises 94 
percent of its commitments in these countries and it is 100 percent for many of the 
individual projects.  In line with its mission to act as a strategic partner for private 
firms and governments, the EBRD share in the value of these projects is 29 percent. 
 
Only a fraction of CIS-7 countries are members of the Asian Development Bank (see 
Table 7). Table 15 shows ADB lending to these countries.
21 In the aggregate, 
commitments total 885 million dollars. (In both the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, 
the ADB is a more important source of finance than the EBRD.) The focus of ADB 
lending is largely directed at infrastructural development (energy and roads projects), 
microfinance initiatives and institution building (financial systems, social services): 
65 percent goes to either transport/communications or social infrastructure projects. 
 
The terms of multilateral financing are an important topic for debate. As was 
discussed in section 2, there have been several prominent calls for a shift towards 
concessional loan terms and outright grants in financing low-income reformist 
countries. In this regard, as is shown in Table 16, there is considerable variation 
among the CIS-7 countries. At one extreme, the poorest country (Tajikstan) enjoys 
concessional terms on almost all of its multilateral debt.  At the other, the multilateral 
debt of Uzbekistan is almost entirely at non-concessional terms.  This mix has also 
changed over time. For instance, World Bank lending has increasingly taken the form 
of concessional IDA loans. The PRGF program at the International Monetary Fund 
has also improved the generosity of the terms of its lending to these countries. 
 
Having described the financial support provided by the international financial 
institutions to the CIS-7 countries, we turn now to asking some questions about the 
effectiveness of multilateral lending to this pool of countries. In Table 17, we examine 
whether an increase in multilateral debt is associated with an increase or decrease in 
other sources of financing (bilateral debt and private debt). This is an important issue, 
since it is essential to know the joint behavior of multilateral and other sources of 
                                                 




funds in order to understand the total net impact on the recipient country. We run 




it it it DEBT DEBT α βε = ++  (2) 
 
where X denotes bilateral or private per-capita debt and MLT denotes multilateral 
debt. We consider two variants: pooled and fixed-effects specifications. From 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 17, we observe a positive relation between the levels of 
multilateral debt and bilateral debt.
22 Regarding private debt, the pooled specification 
in column (3) does not show a significant relation with multilateral debt but this is 
overturned in the fixed-effects specification in column (4). It is interesting to note that 
columns (2) and (4) yield the same point coefficients: the within-country co-
movement with respect to multilateral debt is the same for debt from private lenders 
as debt from bilateral creditors.  
 
The fixed-effects results in Table 17 indicate that a credit multiplier does exist for the 
CIS-7 countries in the sense that multilateral debt appears to leverage bilateral and 
private lending. To some extent, this may be the deliberate result of co-financing 
arrangements (e.g. between the EBRD and some bilateral donors). More generally, it 
possibly reflects the important role played by multilateral lending in signalling the 
quality of the investment climate in a given host country: if a country fails to qualify 
for multilateral financial assistance, it may be viewed as a poor candidate for bilateral 
or private funding. A more pessimistic interpretion runs along the over-borrowing 
lines: in political settings in which multiple powerful groups have access to fiscal 
resources, an increase in official financial assistance may prompt a disproportionate 
increase in inappropriate expenditures. This is labelled the ‘voracity effect’ by Tornell 
and Lane (1999): their theoretical model predicts that an increase in aid also generates 
an increase in other borrowings. 
 
The analysis in Tables 18-20 asks whether debt flows respond to reforms in the CIS-7 
countries. The answer to this question may provide some information for the 
conditionality debate. The standard prescription is that well-behaved reformers should 
                                                 
22 We do not claim to show that this is a causal relationship but merely that these variables are 
significantly correlated. A causality test would require much more information than is available.  
- 16 -
16
be rewarded with increased financial support, whereas funding cannot be justified for 
serial non-reformers.
23  Against this view, if the multilateral institutions play the role 
for the international community as the ‘creditors of last resort,’ humanitarian 
considerations may militate against denying funding to a desperately-poor country, 
regardless of its reform record. Moreover, it is reasonable to conjecture that, at least in 
some finely-balanced political equilibria, a persistent lack of financing may diminish 
the probability of reform by increasing the relative influence of isolationalists versus 
outwardly-orientated integrationist political blocs.
24 Finally, another relevant 
consideration is that a country with a good reform record may be able to achieve 
access to private sources of credit and hence graduate from dependence on official 
financial flows. 
 








it FLOW  is the year-t per-capita financial flow from lender class X 
(multilaterals, bilaterals and private banks) and  1 it REFORM −  is the value of a given 
reform indicator from year t-1.  In order to conserve space, we do not report results 
for each individual EBRD reform indicator. Rather, we just include the two most 
important economic reforms (price and trade liberalization) and two composite 
indicators (SINDEX and MINDEX). SINDEX is just the unweighted average of the 
EBRD indicators that were earlier reported in Tables 4 and 5.
25 Following Wolf 
(2002), we also include the geometric average of the variables (MINDEX), in order to 
allow for possible interactions among the various components of structural reform. 
The time period is 1996-2000. 
 
The results for the pooled specifications in Table 18 do indeed show a positive cross-
country relation between the level of reform and financial flows from the multilateral 
institutions: those countries that have done more liberalization of prices and trade 
                                                 
23 Indeed, non-reformers may indirectly benefit from exclusion from funding if it stimulates reform in 
these countries. 
24 See Eichengreen and Casella (1996).  
25 We omit the legal reform indicators, since these are only available for 1998-1999.  
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receive more multilateral financial flows.
26 However, with the exception of the price 
liberalization variable, the fixed-effects specifications show that the within-country 
relation is actually negative: a country that improves its reform record experiences a 
decline in multilateral flows.  As noted above, interpreting such a negative pattern is 
difficult.  On the one side, it may be consistent with multilaterals failing to reward 
reform or, conversely, countries avoiding reform by relying on the availability of 
external financing. On the other side, it may simply signal that reform improves 
access to private sources of financing.  
 
The evidence on the relation between reform and bilateral financial flows is given in 
Table 19. In this case, we see no time-series connection between reform and bilateral 
flows: a country that improves its reform performance does not experience greater 
bilateral financial inflows. However, at least for the composite indicators SINDEX 
and MINDEX, the pooled specifications do suggest that, in the cross-section, those 
countries that are further along the reform path receive more bilateral support.   
 
Finally, we turn to private debt flows in Table 20. The simple pooled specification 
does not do a very good job in explaining the cross-sectional variation in private debt 
flows: the results are typically insignificant, with the only exception being a positive 
relation between trade liberalization and private flows. However, the time-series 
fixed-effects results are quite striking: if a country improves its reform record, it 
experiences a growth in private bank financial inflows.
27  In combination with the 
fixed-effects results for multilateral flows in Table 18, the picture that emerges is that 
reform tends to alter the composition of the source of financial flows away from 
multilaterals and towards private flows. Indeed, such a reconfiguration could be a 
desirable evolution as countries move up the reform ladder. However, to the extent 
that it does indeed reflect a failure of the multilaterals to sufficiently reward reform, it 
is potentially a cause for concern. Of course, the results presented here are only 
                                                 
26 The pooled results also confirm this for the key price liberalization and trade liberalization indices, 
such that these results hold across countries also. However, the pooled results are not significant for the 
broader composite indices SINDEX and MINDEX: these variables only are significant along the time 
series dimension for multilateral flows.  
 
27 For trade liberalization, SINDEX and MINDEX. The price liberalization indicator is not significant. 
The lack of explanatory power for price liberalization throughout Tables 17-19 may just reflect that the 
major phase of price liberalizatiosn was largely completed before our sample period begins.  
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suggestive: a more comprehensive empirical framework would be required to fully 
test these hypotheses. 
 
In summary, this section has reviewed some elements of the involvement of the 
international financial institutions in the post-Soviet experiences of the CIS-7 
countries. The institutions have certainly responded to the mandate of the 
international community to play an active role in the reform efforts of these countries 
on all fronts (policy advice, technical assistance and financial support). Although 
errors have undoubtedly occurred --- we will return to the high official debt burdens 
in some of these countries that are a matter for serious concern --- it would be difficult 
to claim that the CIS-7 countries would have performed better without the 
interventions of these agencies. However, the CIS-7 remain under-developed, as do 
many other low-income countries, and so it is appropriate to ask more from the 
international financial institutions in terms of finding new ways to promote 
development and growth. 
 
5.  A New Role for the International Financial Institutions 
 
The last several years have seen much effort to reform the international financial 
institutions. Among the major influences on this debate have been the regular reviews 
by the G-7 countries, especially at the summits at Halifax (1995), Cologne (1999), 
Okinawa (2000) and Rome (2001). In addition, the US Congress established an 
International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (the ‘Meltzer Commission’) 
that reported in 1999.  The institutions themselves have also responded with self-




Although the reform agenda was in part inspired by the large-scale international 
financial crises that were experienced during the 1990s, there was also considerable 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the international financial institutions in 
assisting the development of low-income countries. For instance, the 1998 World 
                                                 
28 See also Buira (2002) on the evolution of IMF thinking regarding the conditionality debate.  
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Bank report Assessing Aid provided a severe critique of the failure of aid to improve 
performance in countries that maintained distorted policy regimes, whereas it 
confirmed that aid did indeed play a useful role in countries with sound management 
that were firmly on the reform path. 
 
A central principle in this new thinking is that national development strategies are 
most effective if ‘owned’ by domestic society. Ownership is established by ensuring 
the participation of the broad political establishment, the social partners and civil 
society in the process of designing and evaluating development strategies and targets. 
The role of the international community in this process to provide external advice and 
technical support as needed and to ensure the design of financial assistance programs 
is consistent with the domestic development strategy. Consistency involves both 
arranging the financing required to make the strategy feasible and setting conditions 
on aid that reinforce the incentives to fulfil the targets specified in the strategy 
document. 
 
At one level, this is the very philosophy underlying the Poverty Reduction and 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) process that has been adopted by the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank. In turn, the PRSP feeds into an overall Comprehensive 
Development Framework (CDF) process that attempts to marshall the advice and 
assistance coming from the World Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy, the 
International Monetary Fund’s Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility and the policy 
frameworks of the other multilateral development banks and the United Nations.  
 
In this way, it is hoped that the assistance provided by the international community 
can be better streamlined and coordinated across the various agencies.
 29 Moreover, a 
comprehensive framework may also improve efficiency by facilitating greater 
specialization by individual institutions. Emphasizing the goal of poverty reduction in 
low-income countries is also intended to sharpen the focus of the multilateral 
development banks and the work of the International Monetary Fund in these 
countries. 
                                                 
29 See the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (2002) for an analysis of the scope for 




Although it is difficult to argue against a holistic approach to understanding the 
development needs of each country, there is a concern that an excessively broad 
agenda may lead to mission creep and a loss of focus for individual agencies. In 
particular, the involvement of the International Monetary Fund in long-term poverty-
reduction programs is troubling to some observers, since it represents a departure 
from its traditional mandate.
30 However, the counter-argument is that overall 
consistency requires that all institutions be involved in understanding the broad 
development strategy for each individual country. This is perfectly consistent with the 
lending and policy surveillance activities of each agency remaining specialized, with 
the International Monetary Fund largely focusing on advising and monitoring 
performance in terms of the appropriate macroeconomic policies and the multilateral 
development banks more involved in the sectoral and institutional elements in 
achieving progress on reform and structural change. 
 
In terms of development priorities, it is also recognized that the international financial 
institutions need to support and insist on better governance in borrower countries.  In 
addition to providing financial and technical assistance to improve the quality of 
public sector management, expenditure programs and legal and regulatory codes and 
practices, this also involves regular monitoring of the performance of borrower 
countries in improving governance. By implication, a country that persists with 
inadequate governance structures and anti-developmental policies may be deemed a 
poor candidate for continued financial support. Moreover, under such circumstances, 
financial assistance may do more harm than good if it is allocated to inappropriate 
projects or disappears through corruption. 
 
Striking the correct balance on this issue poses a major challenge for the international 
financial institutions. On the one side, the withdrawal of support from a regime that 
fails to promote development must be seen to be a credible threat: there have to be 
circumstances under which this option is exercised. Given the poor reform record of 
the CIS-7 countries and the observed accumulation of high levels of external debt, the 
existing evidence suggests that this option could perhaps have been exercised at an 
                                                 
30 Indeed, the Meltzer Commission recommended the abolition of the PRGF program at the 
International Monetary Fund.  
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earlier point in some of these countries. Although some factors behind the increase in 
the debt burden may not have been easy to forecast (e.g. the spillover from the 1998 
Russian ruble devaluation and debt default), it is arguable that the multilaterals were 
too willing to lend to countries that had a small short-term likelihood of engaging in 
reform. Of course, this kind of lending pattern has also occurred in other developing 
countries. For instance, Easterly (2001) provides a sharp critique of the lending 
culture of the World Bank and the poor returns on many of the supported projects. 
 
On the other side, it is quite understandable that the multilaterals may opt to remain 
engaged with even countries that persistently fail to deliver. As previously noted, 
there may be a fear that non-engagement will strengthen the political hand of anti-
reform political elements. In addition, the leaders of the international financial 
institutions may feel under pressure from the official policies of their major 
shareholders to be active in supporting these countries: the political fallout of walking 
away could be considerable.  
 
There is no easy solution to this problem. However, based on the history of the 
relations between the multilaterals and the CIS-7 countries, it seems that an essential 
element of a ‘new start’ is to establish that a withdrawal of support will indeed occur 
in the event of an egregious failure to fulfil commitments. In combination with this 
tough love in response to non-performance, another important element of the new 
approach is to recognize that more grant aid and a greater degree of concessionality in 
loan conditions is appropriate for countries that are prepared to reform but are still 
reliant on official financing. In part, this is a reaction to the adverse development 
status of many highly-indebted poor countries. More generally, it also reflects the fact 
that the resources required for rapid development exceed the level that can be 
comfortably borrowed and that excessive external debt distorts and constrains 
development strategies.  
 
An element of this initiative is to encourage renewed efforts at debt reduction 
packages, both vis-à-vis the multilaterals but also with respect to bilateral creditors 
(e.g. through Paris Club agreements). This in part recognizes that previous financial 
assistance was perhaps inappropriately designed: a high debt burden reflects bad  
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decisions by lenders as well as debtors. In addition, it is motivated by the need to 
enable these countries to undertake a fresh start.  
 
The reforms have also involved a new emphasis on transparency and public access to 
core economic data. Although not designed with the CIS-7 countries primarily in 
mind, these countries have also been affected by the drive for greater openness. The 
websites of each of the international financial institutions provide large amounts of 
information about the economies and policies of these countries, plus their financial 
dealings with the multilaterals. Indeed, Armenia, Azerbaijan and the Kyrgyz Republic 




At another level, the international financial institutions have developed mechanisms 
for more accountability in their own activities: for instance, the International 
Monetary Fund has established an independent Evaluation Office to study its 
performance in a range of areas and it has invited external reviews of its research and 
surveillance operations in recent years. 
 
6.  The Future Role of the International Community in Assisting the CIS-7 
 
It remains fundamentally true that the future development of the CIS-7 countries is 
primarily the responsibility of the countries themselves.  This requires a massive and 
sustained commitment by the key domestic actors in these countries to formulate and 
establish the required institutions and deploy the appropriate resources that will permit 
their countries to pursue sustainable development.  
 
That said, the recent UN-organized Monterrey Financing for Development conference 
and Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development have reinforced the 
commitment of the international community to provide multi-faceted assistance in this 
effort. Building a ‘global partnership for development’ is one of the UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals: developing countries not expected to go it alone. Indeed, the 
CIS-7 initiative itself is evidence of a renewed determination by the international 
                                                 
31 For Armenia, a ROSC is also available with respect to Data Dissemination.  
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community (and the international financial institutions in particular) to do more to 
facilitate economic growth and poverty reduction in those countries that have been 
lagging behind in the development process. 
 
However, it is not the case that the international financial institutions, at least as 
currently constituted, can deliver all the assistance required by the CIS-7 in their 
development efforts.  At a financial level, the resources controlled by the international 
financial institutions are limited and deployment is subject to the constitutions and 
mandates of these organizations. As such, bilateral sources and ‘global’ funds that 
aggregate donations from individual donors must be recognized as important potential 
components of overall financial assistance. In this regard, in view of the competition 
for funds provided by other low-income countries, a challenge for the CIS-7 countries 
is to demonstrate to such potential donors that they are indeed worthy recipients of 
assistance, since each individual donor must weigh the marginal impact of extra aid in 
alternative destinations.  
 
In the near term, these considerations also carry over into negotiations concerning 
debt relief and rescheduling from official bilateral donors at the Paris Club. Sachs 
(2002) argues that the terms of debt relief should be considered on a country-by-
country basis, using in-depth analysis of each country’s specific profile and prospects. 
This would represent a major change from current conventions that apply a set of 
uniform numerical criteria (e.g. with respect to GDP per capita, the debt-export ratio, 
and the ratio of private to official bilateral debt) in order to determine the scale of 
relief that is due each candidate country.
32 
 
Of course, it is also desirable that donor nations also increase the aggregate pool of 
funds that are potentially transferable to low-income countries such that all countries 
that meet reform criteria may receive access to sufficient funding. On this front, it is 
important that the donor countries strive to meet the aid targets set under the 
Millennium Development Goals.  To ameliorate the proliferation problem, increased 
pooling of funds among donors is also to be encouraged. For the CIS-7 countries, 
                                                 
32 The most recent Paris Club agreement for a CIS-7 country was for the Kyrgyz Republic in March 
2002. It qualified for ‘Houston terms’ which provides an ‘intermediate’ level of favourable treatment.  
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further integration of aid policies by European Union members would be particularly 
beneficial. 
 
In addition, catalyzing private financial flows is an important goal if sufficient 
financing is to be provided.  Indeed, Buiter and Lankes (2000) argue that the 
constrained resources of the international financial institutions means that their 
mandates should be generally re-orientated towards facilitating private flows to low-
income countries. In addition to helping governments to create the institutional and 
infrastructural conditions for market-orientated growth (which is already the goal of 
the international financial institutions), this also possibly involves them becoming 
participant investors in collaboration with the private sector through various 
arrangements.
33 Exploring an enhanced role for public-private partnerships and 
innovative ways by which the multilaterals can leverage private capital flows has also 
been supported by the United Nations (2002). 
 
It is also the case that the complexity of the development challenges facing these 
countries is such that the scope of required policy advice and technical assistance is 
far broader than can be feasibly be provided by the World Bank and, especially, the 
International Monetary Fund. Zecchini (1995) concluded his evaluation of the 
performance of the international financial institutions in the transition countries with  
 
“… the question remains as to whether other instruments apart from the IFIs have to 
be mobilized to help some reforming countries catch up in the quest for a liberal and 
prosperous economy.” 
 
The required consistency of approach across member countries inevitably constrains 
the multilateral institutions in their ability to deviate too far from ‘normal’ terms and 
conditions in individual countries: the legitimacy and universality of these institutions 
relies on taking an even-handed approach.  The financial structures of the institutions 
are also such that a higher volume of lending in one zone constrains the capacity to 
act in other regions that are deserving of assistance. Kapur (2002) also emphasizes 
that the international financial institutions do not have the competence or the 
                                                 
33Zecchini (1995) also highlights the potential of investment partnerships with the private sector.  
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flexibility to provide assistance on all aspects of the institution-building process that 
must take place in such countries.   
 
Along these lines, United Nations agencies such as the FAO, WHO, UNICEF and 
UNECE potentially have much to offer in specific reform areas, as do some non-
governmental organizations and European Union programs.  One implication is that, 
even if the two Washington-based institutions do a reasonable job in coordination, the 
problem of streamlining and managing the supply of policy advice and technical 
assistance from a broad set of agencies is in itself a considerable challenge. Moreover, 
for full effectiveness, an awareness of the activities and resource needs of these other 
agencies must feed back into the operations and lending decisions of the international 
financial institutions.  
 
Recent efforts to improve the targeting and better coordinate the delivery of technical 
assistance across the institutions are also to be welcomed. This involves greater 
specialization in areas of core competence by each institution. Beyond the traditional 
function of training government officials, an interesting potential development would 
be to include representatives from civil society as participants (see International 
Monetary Fund 2002).
34 This would have the effect of broadening the capacity for 
more effective program design and improving the quality of the PRSP process. 
Another innovation that may be relevant for the CIS is the recent establishment of two 
IMF regional technical assistance centers in Africa. A similar regional base may be 
useful for the CIS, including the spillover benefits from the joint training of officials 
from neighboring countries. 
 
Beyond the direct aid provided by the international community to the individual CIS-
7 countries, their development has other international dimensions. Clearly, it is 
desirable that the European Union and other industrial countries further liberalize 
access to imports from these and other developing countries. Promoting cooperation 
among the CIS countries in reducing trade barriers and, where feasible, the cross-
border integration of energy networks are positive-sum endeavours.  
                                                 
34 An interesting historical parallel is that the Ford Foundation supported in the 1960s the development 
of a non-governmental policy think tank in Ireland, in order to establish an independent source of 




Regional associations can also provide useful opportunities for information exchange, 
learning about reform experiments elsewhere and enhancing cooperation on policy 
initiatives. Moreover, they can establish (formally or informally) feasible performance 
benchmarks that may stimulate reform efforts. Such ‘yardstick’ competition also 
generates peer pressure on laggards to improve performance.
35 Of course, although 
they do not form a contiguous geographical group, it is to be hoped that participation 
by these countries in the CIS-7 initiative in itself can provide some of these benefits of 
membership of an international association. Enhanced international monitoring, cross-
member demonstration effects and the potential for information exchange about 
policy and institutional developments should all have beneficial effects on the quality 
of governance in these countries. 
 
The prospects for development of the CIS-7 countries would also be greatly enhanced 
by a more rapid economic recovery in the collective CIS region and Russia in 
particular. As such, an improved effort by the international community to assist the 
CIS-7 countries is best conducted in the context of a sustained strategy for the overall 
CIS.
36 In turn, sustaining and deepening recent reforms in Russia would provide 
important leadership in demonstrating to the other CIS countries the viability and net 
gains to embracing a more complete transition strategy. 
7. Conclusions 
 
Our goal in this paper has been to review and evaluate the performance of the 
international community and the international financial institutions in assisting the 
development of the CIS-7 countries, with an eye towards identifying the appropriate 
strategies for the future.  
 
At least in some dimensions, the CIS-7 countries have made notable progress since 
the mid-1990s and the international financial institutions have been heavily involved 
                                                 
35 See also Braga de Macedo (2002) on the potential of regional arrangements in stimulating reform 
and development efforts. 
36 Of course, the needs of the different member countries vary greatly and the nature of assistance may 
differ both in terms of intensity and form as between the low-income CIS-7 countries and other 
countries in the region.  
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in efforts to encourage reform in these countries. However, the deeper reforms that 
remain are primarily the responsibility of the domestic authorities: for instance, it 
would be an infringement of sovereignty for the international financial institutions to 
insist on particular designs for domestic public institutions and legal codes. If the 
international community wishes to more directly intervene in these areas, the 
international financial institutions are not the appropriate agents for such state-
building exercises. 
 
In terms of policy advice, the initial focus was on securing macroeconomic 
stabilization but the major priority has been to advance the reform agenda, especially 
in redefining the role of government in these countries. The resources committed to 
technical assistance have been substantial: however, the greatest success has 
inevitably been in the more technocratic policy areas (such as establishing functioning 
central banks), with relatively less penetration in the more diffuse areas such as 
establishing the rule of law and creating an investment-friendly business environment. 
Related to the conclusion in the previous paragraph, this reflects the limits of the 
scope of the international financial institutions. 
 
Financial flows from the international financial institutions to the CIS-7 countries 
have been very significant, as have bilateral flows in some cases. The large rise in 
official external debt relative to output during this period does not suggest an 
unwillingness to provide financing for these countries and may even represent 
‘overlending.’ In part, this signals that the institutions should become tougher in 
assessing whether financial support will be well used in each case. However, it also 
suggests that greater concessionality is desirable for those countries that demonstrate a 
commitment to reform and development. 
 
At this stage, many of these recommendations for change have already begun to be 
reflected in the official policies and practices of the international financial institutions 
and their major shareholders.  In regard to the CIS-7 countries, perhaps the major 
challenge now is to ensure effective implementation of the new procedures and 
financial policies. Since all of these countries will likely remain clients of the 
international financial institutions into the medium-term, this involves a sustained 
commitment to assist these countries in formulating and appropriate development  
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strategies. However, it also requires a determination to rigorously discriminate 
between progressive and anti-reform actions by the policymakers. In this way, by 
rewarding and encouraging progress in reform, the international community and the 
international financial institutions will continue to have an essential role in supporting 
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Table 1. The CIS-7 Basic Facts 
 
            
            
 Per  Capita  Population  Infant Life  Landlocked?  Major 
 GDP    Mortality  Expectancy    Conflict? 
            
            
Armenia 2807.8  3.34  41.3  66.5  Yes Yes 
Azerbaijan 3225.6  7.77 83.1 63  Yes  Yes 
Georgia 2839.1  4.99  52.4  64.6  No Yes 
Kyrgyz Republic  2822.8  4.75  76.5  63.5  Yes  No 
Moldova 2351.5  4.43  42.7  64.6  Yes  Yes 
Tajikistan  1207.2 6.58  116.1 64.2  Yes  Yes 
Uzbekistan 2515.9  22.2 71.9 63.8  Yes  Yes 
            
            
 
 
Note: Data from CIA World Factbook and World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators. The economic and social indicators are for 2001. Per capita GDP is in PPP 
current international dollars; Population is in millions; Infant mortality is mortality 




Table 2. Output Growth Rates of CIS-7, 1991-2001 
 
        
        
 ARM.  AZE.  GEO.  KYR.  MOL.  TJK.  UZB. 
        
        
1991 -12.4 -0.7  -21.1 -7.8  -17.5 -7.1  -0.5 
1992 -52.6 -22.7 -44.9 -13.9 -34.6 -28.9 -11.1 
1993 -14.1 -23.1 -29.3 -15.5 -1.2  -11.1 -2.3 
1994 5.4  -19.7 -10.4 -19.8 -30.9 -21.4 -4.2 
1995  6.9  -11.8  2.6  -5.4 -1.4 -12.5  -0.9 
1996  5.9 1.3 10.5  7  -5.9  -4.4  1.6 
1997  3.3 5.8 10.6  9.9 1.6 1.7 2.5 
1998  7.3 10  2.9 2.1 -6.5  5.3 4.3 
1999  3.3 7.4 3  3.7 -3.4  3.7 4.3 
2000  6  11.1  1.9 5.4 2.1 8.3 3.8 
2001  9.6 9  4.5 5.3 6.1 10.2  4.5 
        
        












Table 3. Inflation Rates of CIS-7, 1991-2001 
 
 
         
         
 ARM.  AZE.  GEO.  KYR.  MOL.  TJK.  UZB. 
         
         
1991  100.3 105.6 78.5  85  162  111.6 109.7 
1992  824.5 912.6 887.4  853.8 1276  1156.7  645.2 
1993  3731.8 1129.7 3125.4  772.4  788.5  2194.9 534.2 
1994  5273.4  1664  15606.5  190.1 329.6 350.4 1568.3 
1995 176.7  411.8  162.7  43.5  30.2  610  304.6 
1996  18.7 19.8 39.3  32  23.5 418.2  54 
1997 14  3.7  7  23.5  11.8  88  70.9 
1998  8.7 -0.8  3.6  10.5  7.7 43.2  29 
1999  0.7  -8.5 19.1  35.9 39.3 27.5 29.1 
2000  -0.8 1.8  4  18.7 31.3 32.9 25 
2001  3.2 1.5 4.7  7  9.8 38.6  27.2 
         
         
 


























Table 4. The CIS-7 and Reform: 1991-1999 Panel Estimation 
 
        
        
 CIS-7  adj  R2  N  Period 
        
        
Price Liberalization  -0.16  0.01  225  1991-1999 
 (1.62)       
        
Trade Liberalization  -0.86  0.09  225  1991-1999 
 (4.91)***       
        
Small-scale Privatization  -0.69  0.07  225  1991-1999 
 (4.42)***       
        
Large-scale Privatization  -0.35  0.02  225  1991-1999 
 (2.59)**       
        
Enterprise Reform  -0.51  0.1  225  1991-1999 
 (6.05)***       
        
Competition Policy  -0.49  0.02  225  1991-1999 
 (3.32)***       
        
Infrastructure Reform  -0.56  0.12  50  1998-1999 
 (3.3)***       
        
Banking Sector Reform  -0.61  0.11  222  1991-1999 
 (6.15)***       
        
Reform of Non-Banking 
Sector 
-0.57 0.14  220  1991-1999 
 (7.1)***       
        
Legal Extensiveness   -0.3  0.02  70  1998-1999 
 (1.68)*       
        
Legal Effectiveness  -0.65  0.11  70  1998-1999 
 (3.68)***       
        
        
 
Note: Reform indicators taken from EBRD’s Annual Transition Reports. t-statistics in 





Table 5. The CIS-7 and Reform: 1999 Cross-Section 
 
 
        
        
   CIS-7  adj  R2  N  Period 
        
        
(1) Price  Liberalization  -0.05 -0.04  25 1999 
   (.29)     
        
(2) Trade  Liberalization  -0.29 -0.03  25 1999 
   (.6)     
        
(3) Small-scale  Privatization  -0.4  0.03  25 1999 
   (1.72)*     
        
(4) Large-scale  Privatization  -0.21 -0.03  25 1999 
   (.74)     
        
(5) Enterprise  Reform  -0.46 0.11  25 1999 
   (2.98)***     
        
(6) Competition  Policy  -0.45 0.09  25 1999 
   (2.29)**     
        
(7) Infrastructure  Reform -0.55 0.08  25 1999 
   (2.1)**     
        
(8)  Banking Sector Reform  -0.66  0.1  25  1999 
   (2.47)***     
        
(9)  Reform of Non-Banking 
Sector 
-0.64 0.16  25 1999 
   (2.75)***     
        
(10)  Legal Extensiveness   -0.36  0.01  25  1999 
   (1.16)     
        
(11) Legal  Effectiveness  -0.53  0.06 25  1999 
   (1.54)     
        
        
 
Note: Reform indicators taken from EBRD’s Annual Transition Reports. t-statistics in 







Table 6. Total Aid Flows to the CIS-7 (As a Percentage of Gross National Income) 
 
          
          
  1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 AVG 
          
          
Armenia  7.6 18.3  10.1  7.5 11.3  11.2  11.0 
Azerbaijan  4.9 3.1  4.7 2.3 3.7 2.8 3.6 
Georgia  11.5  10.3  6.5 4.6 8.4 5.6 7.8 
Kyrgyz  Rep. 19.5 12.9  14.1 14.4 24.1 16.7 16.9 
Moldova  2.2 2.1  3.3 2.3 8.9 9.0 4.6 
Tajikistan  2.9 10.4  9.6 8.4 11.9  15.2  9.8 
Uzbekistan 0.8 0.6  1.0 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.0 
          
          
 




Table 7. Year of Membership of the International Financial Institutions 
 
      
      
Country IMF  WB  EBRD  ADB 
      
      
Armenia  1992 1992 1992 .. 
Azerbaijan  1992 1992 1992 1999 
Georgia  1992 1992 1992 .. 
Kyrgyzstan  1992 1992 1992 1994 
Moldova  1992 1992 1992 .. 
Tajikistan  1993 1993 1992 1998 
Uzbekistan  1992 1992 1992 1995 
      
      
 

















 ARM  KYR  TJK 
      
      
Fiscal Affairs Division  3  7  14 
      
Monetary and Exchange Rate 
Affairs 
9 12  15 
      
Statistics 4  9  11 
      
Legal     1 
      
Treasury     1 
      
Annual Average  4  5.6  4.2 






































Table 9. External Debt Statistics, 1995 and 2000 
 
             
             
 Debt/GNI  LT/Total  MLT    BILAT   BANK   
             
  1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000 1995  2000 1995  2000 
             
             
ARM  13 46 80 76 70 72 30  26 0  3 
AZE  11 24 64 58 48 46 52  26 0  27 
GEO  68 54 84 80 24 37 67  60 10  3 
KYR  19 150  78 83 39 48 61  31 0  21 
MOL  23 91 66 85 47 39 47  12 6  49 
TJK  28 125  93 85 0  17 88  14  12  42 
UZB      79 91 17 12 55  40 28  49 
             
             
 
Note: Data are from World Bank’s Global Development Finance Online Database. 
Debt/GNI is the ratio of total external debt to gross national income. LT/Total is ratio 
of long-term to total external debt. MLT, BILAT and BANK refer to the shares of 
long-term debt that are owed to the multilateral institutions, bilateral donors and 





























Table 10. History of Lending Arrangements with IMF: Recent Activity 
 
          
         
  Facility Arranged  Expired  or  Agreed Drawn  Outstanding 
     C a n c e l l e d      
          
          
ARM  PRGF2 23/05/2001 22/05/2004  91.07  13.2  13.2 
ARM  PRGF2  14/02/1996  20/12/1999  99.78 99.78 99.78 
          
ARM  PRGF  14/02/1996  20/12/1999  44.54 44.54 37.86 
ARM  SBA  28/06/1995  14/02/1996  57.91 17.82 0 
     Total  293.29 175.34 150.84 
AZE  PRGF2 06/07/2001 05/07/2004  106.18  21.25  21.25 
AZE  PRGF2 20/12/1996 19/03/2000  96.5  81.06  81.06 
AZE  PRGF  20/12/1996  19/03/2000  27.03 27.03 24.33 
AZE  EA  20/12/1996  19/03/2000  77.21 70.27 65.44 
AZE  SBA  17/11/1995  16/11/1996  77.21 77.21 0 
     Total  384.13 276.81 192.08 
GEO  PRGF2 12/01/2001 11/01/2004  142.54  65.33  65.33 
GEO  ESAF 28/02/1996  13/08/1999  117.2 117.2 117.2 
GEO  ESAF  28/02/1996  13/08/1999  109.87 109.87 98.89 
GEO  SBA 28/06/1995  28/02/1996 95.22  29.3 0 
     Total 464.83  321.7  281.41 
KYR  PRGF2  06/12/2001  05/12/2004  96.87 30.94 30.94 
KYR  PRGF2  26/06/1998  25/07/2001  96.85 58.98 58.98 
KYR  ESAF 20/07/1994  31/03/1998  21.28 21.28 21.28 
KYR  ESAF 20/07/1994  31/03/1998  95.06 95.06 72.81 
KYR  SBA  12/05/1993  11/04/1994  35.75 15.32 0 
     Total  345.81 221.58 184.01 
MOL  PRGF2 21/12/2000 20/12/2003  146.34  36.58  36.58 
MOL  EA  20/05/1996  19/05/2000  178.17 115.48 103.52 
MOL  SBA  22/03/1995  21/03/1996  77.21 42.76 0 
MOL  SBA 17/12/1993  16/03/1995 68.3 68.3 0 
     Total  470.02 263.13 140.11 
TJK  PRGF2  24/06/1998  24/12/2001  132.38 103.31 94.96 
TJK  SBA 08/05/1996  07/12/1996 19.8 19.8 0 
     Total  152.17 123.11 94.96 
UZB  SBA 18/12/1995  17/03/1997 164.58  86.38  0 
         
          
 
Note: Data sourced from IMF website. Millions of US dollars. PRGF2 is Poverty 
Reduction and Growth Facility Trust Fund; ESAF is Enhanced Structural Adjustment 




Table 11. IMF Transactions with CIS-7: 1994-2002 
 
    
    
   ARM AZE  GEO  KYR  MOL  TJK  UZB 
                
                
GRA DISBURSE  62.4  299.0  102.5 57.9  319.9  39.6  218.0 
 REPAY  158.9 135.9  68.9  49.0  201.5  33.4  152.2 
  FEE  16.4 60.3  27.0 17.5 68.8  7.2  53.8 
PRGF DISBURSE  157.5 129.3 292.4 206.3  36.6  103.3  0.0 
 REPAY  8.9  2.7  11.0  25.6  0.0  8.4  0.0 
  FEE  3.3 2.5  5.5 4.4 0.2  1.5 0.0 
TOTAL DISBURSE 219.9 428.3  395.0 264.1  356.4  142.9 218.0 
  REPAY  50.9 138.7  80.0 74.6 201.5  41.8 152.2 
  FEE  19.7 62.9  32.5 21.9 69.0  8.7  53.8 
  DISB/GDP  .11 .08  .13 .17 .24  .14 .02 
    
 
Note: Data sourced from IMF website. GRA is the general resource account; PRGF is 
the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility. DISBURSE are disbursements; REPAY 
repayments; and FEE refers to charges and interest payments. Cumulative flows. 
Millions of US dollars. DISB/GDP is cumulative disbursements as a ratio to GDP in 





Table 12. World Bank Lending to CIS-7: Cumulative to end-2001 
 
              
              
 ARM  AZE  GEO  KYR  MOL  TJK  UZB 
              
              
Commitments 696  531  651  N/A  505  302  539 
              
Disbursements 513  301  460  449  351  189  251 
              
COMM/GDP 0.35  0.26 0.32  N/A  0.25  0.15 0.27 
              
DISB/GDP 0.25  0.15  0.23  0.29 0.17  0.09  0.12 
              
              
 
Note: Data sourced from World Bank. Millions of US Dollars. COMM/GDP and 
DISB/GDP are ratios of cumulative commitments and disbursements to 2001 GDP in 





Table 13. Sectoral Composition of World Bank Lending 
 
              
              
 LAW  IND  AG  EM  TRAN  FIN  WSF  HSS  ED  IC 
              
              
ARM  0.22 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.09  0.08 0.06  0.05 0.04 0.01 
AZE  0.20 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.07  0.15 0.14  0.05 0.01 0.00 
GEO  0.26 0.20 0.04 0.19 0.09  0.06 0.03  0.10 0.03 0.00 
KYR              
MOL  0.27 0.25 0.14 0.06 0.01  0.17 0.01  0.04 0.05 0.01 
TJK  0.24 0.17 0.13 0.04 0.03  0.17 0.07  0.12 0.02 0.02 
UZB  0.12 0.33 0.10 0.00 0.05  0.08 0.26  0.06 0.00 0.00 
              
SUM  0.22 0.21 0.11 0.10 0.06  0.11 0.09  0.07 0.03 0.00 
              
              
 
Note:  Data sourced from World Bank website. Shares in total cumulative 
commitments. LAW is the ‘law and public administration’ category; IND ‘Industry & 
Trade’; AG ‘Agriculture’; EM ‘Energy & Mining’; TRAN ‘Transport’; FIN 
‘Finance’; WSF ‘Water, Sanitation, Flood Protection’; HSS ‘Healthcare & Social 




Table 14. EBRD Activity: Cumulative Investments to end-2001 
 
      
      
 Total  EBRD  EBRD  Total 
 EBRD  Debt  Equity  Project 
      
      
ARM  140.4 115.6 24.8  222.2 
AZE  393.1 378.2 14.9  2984.6 
GEO  249.1 234.8 14.2  939.9 
KYR  189.9 175.1 14.8  771.8 
MOL  210.7 191.3 19.5  364 
TJK  37.7 34.1 3.6  64.4 
UZB  689.6 657.3 32.3  1353.6 
TOTAL 1910.5 1786.4 124.1 6700.5
      
 
Note: Data sourced from EBRD website. Millions of euro. Total Project is estimated 







Table 15. Asian Development Bank Loan: Cumulative Lending to 2002 
 
       
       
 KYR  TJK  UZB  AVG  SUM 
       
       
Total  293 126 466 295 885 
Shares:       
Agriculture/Nat.Resources  0.12 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.09 
Transport/Communications  0.32 0.31 0.26 0.30 0.29 
Social  Infrastructure  0.21 0.16 0.52 0.29 0.36 
Finance  0.24 0.00 0.15 0.13 0.16 
Multi-Sectoral  0.05 0.36 0.00 0.14 0.07 
Other  0.05 0.08 0.00 0.04 0.03 
       
       
 
Note: Data sourced from ADB website. Millions of US dollars. AVG is the 
unweighted average across the countries; SUM is the total lending to the three 








 IMF  World 
Bank 
RDB 
      
      
Armenia 79%  98%  0% 
Azerbaijan 0%  100% 0% 
Georgia 78%  100%  0% 
Kyrgyz. Rep.  0%  100%  78% 
Moldova 7%  34%  0% 
Tajikistan 77%  100%  100% 




Note: Ratio of concessional to total cumulative net financial flows over 1994-2000. 













Table 17. Is there a Credit Multiplier to Multilateral Lending?  
 
          
          
    Multilateral   Adj  R2   NOBS 
          
          
Bilateral  (1)   0.16  0.06   41 
    (3.71)***      
          
  (2)   0.21  0.97   41 
    (9.44)***      
          
Bank  (3)   0.02  -0.02   42 
    (0.34)      
          
  (4)   0.21  0.33   42 
    (3.23)***      
          
          
 
Notes: Debt data taken from joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank external debt 
database. t-statistics in paretheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 


























Table 18. Do Debt Flows Reward Reform? Multilateral Flows 
 
        
        
   Multilateral  Adj  R2  NOBS  FE? 
        
        
Price Liberalization  (1)  16.31  0.08  35  No 
   (5.41)***     
        
 (2)  1.5  0.47  35  Yes 
   (1.36)     
        
Trade Liberalization  (3)  3.44  0.05  35  No 
   (1.99)**     
        
 (4)  -9.35  0.63  35  Yes 
   (3.74)***     
        
SINDEX (5)  3.41  -0.03  35  No 
   (.78)    
        
 (6)  -21.3  0.59  35  Yes 
   (3.27)***     
        
MINDEX (7)  0.97  -0.02  35  No 
   (.21)    
        
 (8)  -21.1  0.6  35  Yes 
   (2.95)***     
        
        
     
Note: Debt data taken from joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank external debt database. 
Reform indicators taken from EBRD. t-statistics in paretheses. ***, **, * denote 



















Table 19. Do Debt Flows Reward Reform? Bilateral Flows 
 
        
        
   Bilateral  Adj  R2  NOBS  FE? 
        
        
Price Liberalization  (1)  -1.03  0.08  33  No 
   (1.4)    
        
 (2)  -1.12  0.47  33  Yes 
   (1.57)     
        
Trade Liberalization  (3)  0.37  0.05  33  No 
   (.51)    
        
 (4)  0.17  0.63  33  Yes 
   (.25)    
        
SINDEX (5)  2.68  0.08  33  No 
   (1.8)**     
        
 (6)  0.43  0.35  33  Yes 
   (.25)    
        
MINDEX (7)  2.74  0.09  33  No 
   (1.75)*     
        
 (8)  0.35  0.35  33  Yes 
   (.19)    
        
        
 
Note: Debt data taken from joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank external debt database. 
Reform indicators taken from EBRD. t-statistics in paretheses. ***, **, * denote 




Table 20. Do Debt Flows Reward Reform? Bank Flows 
 
        
        
   Bank  Adj  R2  NOBS  FE? 
        
        
Price Liberalization  (1)  0.73  -0.03  35  No 
   (.08)    
        
 (2)  -7.6  0.51  35  Yes 
   (1.0)    
        
Trade Liberalization  (3)  6.11  0.08  35  No 
   (2.14)**     
        
 (4)  10.95  0.59  35  Yes 
   (2.23)***     
        
SINDEX (5)  8.72  0.01  35  No 
   (1.48)     
        
 (6)  23.95  0.57  35  Yes 
   (2.1)**     
        
MINDEX (7)  5.34  -0.02  35  No 
   (1.03)     
        
 (8)  24.43  0.57  35  Yes 
   (2.18)**     
        
        
 
Note: Debt data taken from joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank external debt database. 
Reform indicators taken from EBRD.  t-statistics in paretheses. ***, **, * denote 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 